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‘Overreaching’ or ‘Overreacting’? Reflections
on the Judicial Function and Approaches
of WTO Appellate Body*
Weihuan ZHOU** & Henry GAO***
“If Satan should ever replace God he would find it necessary to assume the attributes of
Divinity.”
Robert A. Heinlein, “Double Star”
Since 2017, the US has blocked appointments to the WTO Appellate Body (AB), citing various
concerns over its judicial approach, with the most significant being the issue of judicial overreach. This
article provides a critical analysis of this issue and makes important contributions to the ongoing debate.
Drawing on the fundamental function of the WTO, it offers a fresh approach to assess judicial
overreach and shows that AB rulings in major non-trade remedy cases (that have consistently
concerned the US) have served that function and hence should not be treated as ‘overreaching’. We
argue that, the allegation of judicial overreach, while untenable, does reflect systemic concerns with the
legislative failure of the WTO Members to provide effective checks against the judicial power. This
will need to be addressed, or else it will continue to haunt the AB or any other adjudicative body that
takes over its role. We propose several fresh solutions to restore a proper balance between the legislative
and judicial functions of the WTO, before concluding that as a Member-driven organization, the
success or failure of the WTO ultimately depends on its Members.
1 INTRODUCTION
The multilateral trading system is at a crossroads. Substantive reform is needed, lest it
falls into dysfunction and oblivion. Among the many challenges facing the system, the
most pressing is the United States’ (US) continuous blockage of the appointment of
members to the WTO’s highest court, the Appellate Body (AB). As of this writing,
less than six months are left for WTO Members to resolve this issue, or the entire
WTO dispute settlement mechanism (DSM) may be paralysed. Indeed, without a
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functioning AB, a disputant can stall the process by simply filing a notice of appeal,
leaving the case in limbo.
The US has taken issue with a host of substantive and procedural problems in the
adjudicative activities of the DSM, especially those concerning the AB. These
included, inter alia, AB creating laws beyond the written rules agreed by WTO
Members (known as ‘judicial overreach’), issuing advisory opinions unnecessary to
resolve disputes, reviewing matters of fact while its function is limited to reviewing
issues of law, establishing a de facto system of precedent whereby its rulings must be
followed by panels in the absence of ‘cogent reasons’, failure to comply with the
mandatory ninety-day deadline for deciding appeals and continued service by persons
who are no longer AB members.1 In order to resolve the AB impasse, WTO
Members have started to propose reforms of the relevant WTO rules, particularly
the Dispute Settlement Understanding2 (DSU), to specifically address US concerns.3
Leading WTO scholars and commentators have also put forward detailed proposals on
how these issues may be resolved.4
A major problem with all the proposals is that they accept the US allegations
without questioning whether these allegations are well founded. While the validity of
the procedure-related allegations is relatively easy to establish, the substantive claims are
more controversial. For example, Gao has criticized the lack of foundation of the US
allegation relating to the AB’s issuance of obiter dicta, also known as advisory opinions.5
Voon and Yanovich have shown that the distinction between issues of law and issues
1 See Office of the United States Trade Representative, 2018 Trade Policy Agenda and 2017 Annual
Report of the President of the United States on the Trade Agreements Program [hereinafter ‘2018 Trade
Policy Agenda’], Mar. 2018, at 22–8, https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/
reports-and-publications/2018/2018-trade-policy-agenda-and-2017.
2 Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, Marrakesh Agreement
Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 2, 1869 U.N.T.S. 401, 33 I.L.M. 1226 (1994).
3 See e.g. WTO, General Council, Minutes of Meeting on 12 Dec. 2018, WT/GC/M/175 (20 Feb.
2019) 18–44.
4 See generally Tetyana Payosova, Gary Clyde Hufbauer & Jeffrey J. Schott, The Dispute Settlement Crisis in
the World Trade Organization: Causes and Cures, Peterson Institute for International Economics Policy Brief
18–5 (Mar. 2018), https://piie.com/system/files/documents/pb18-5.pdf; Robert McDougall, Crisis in the
WTO: Restoring the WTO Dispute Settlement Function, CIGI Papers No. 194 (Oct. 2018), www.cigionline.
org/sites/default/files/documents/Paper%20no.194.pdf; Jennifer Hillman, Three Approaches to Fixing the
World Trade Organization’s Appellate Body: The Good, The Bad and The Ugly?, Inst. of Int’l Econ. L.,
Georgetown University Law Center, IIEL Issue Briefs (10 Dec. 2018), www.law.georgetown.edu/wp-
content/uploads/2018/12/Hillman-Good-Bad-Ugly-Fix-to-WTO-AB.pdf; Andrew Stoler, Crisis in the
WTO Appellate Body and the Need for Wider WTO Reform Negotiations, Inst. for Int’l Trade, The University
of Adelaide, Policy Brief 01 (Mar. 2019), https://iit.adelaide.edu.au/system/files/media/documents/2019-
04/IIT%20PB02%20Crisis%20WTO%20Appellate.pdf; Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, How Should the EU and
Other WTOMembers React to Their WTO Governance and WTO Appellate Body Crises?, EUI Working Paper
RSCAS 2018/71 (Dec. 2018), http://cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/handle/1814/60238/RSCAS_2018_71.
pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y.
5 See generally Henry Gao, Dictum on Dicta: Obiter Dicta in WTO Disputes, 17(3) World Trade Rev.
509(2018). See also Giorgio Sacerdoti, A Comment on Henry Gao, ‘Dictum on Dicta: Obiter Dicta in
WTO Disputes’, 17(3) World Trade Rev. 535 (2018).
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of fact ‘is fraught with difficulty’ and the AB’s review of the former may often need to
rely on an examination of the latter.6 Given the exigency of the AB crisis, it is
understandable for WTO Members to focus on dispelling US concerns rather than
having a lengthy debate over the various issues. However, in the long run, these issues
will need to be properly examined with an aim to reaching a shared understanding of,
and a systematic solution to, the issues.
This article is dedicated to the issue of judicial overreach which is not only
one of the longest-lasting concerns for the US but also the most significant one. In
one of its earliest proposals for DSM reform in 2005, the US cautioned that in
interpreting the WTO agreements, panels and the AB must exercise reasonable
care so as to avoid adding to or diminishing the rights and obligations of Members
under the agreements, as required under Article 3.2 of the DSU.7 More recently,
the US reiterated this concern in almost all of its official condemnation of the AB
and highlighted it as the most significant issue in its 2018 Trade Policy Agenda.8
Other Members recognized that this issue is highly complex and contentious and
hence warrants careful and considerable discussions, but decided to move on to
contemplate a solution to it precisely because of the urgent need to save the
appellate system.9
This article is organized as follows. Section II briefly reviews the concept of
judicial overreach or judicial activism in domestic and international court systems
with a focus on the debate over the DSM. It then considers this issue in light of the
overarching function of the WTO. We show that the underlying function of the
WTO is to constrain the use of protectionist measures while allowing the use of
trade instruments for legitimate, non-protectionist policy objectives. It is submitted
that an AB ruling that serves this function should not be treated as ‘overreaching’.
This offers a fresh approach to examining the issue of judicial overreach. This
approach is important because a judicial interpretation based on the general rule of
interpretation codified in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties10
(VCLT) may well lead to inconsistent results and divergent opinions.11 In such
circumstances, consideration of the underlying function of the WTO provides a
powerful test of whether judicial overreach has occurred. Indeed, in a recent
6 See generally Tania Voon & Alan Yanovich, The Facts Aside: The Limitation of WTO Appeals to Issues of
Law, 40(2) J. World Trade 239 (2006).
7 See generally WTO, Dispute Settlement Body, Negotiations on Improvements and Clarifications of the
Dispute Settlement Understanding, Communication from the United States, TN/DS/W/82/Add.1 (25
Oct. 2005).
8 See Office of the United States Trade Representative, 2018 Trade Policy Agenda, supra n. 1, at 22.
9 See e.g. WTO, WT/GC/M/175, supra n. 3, at 42–3.
10 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1969, 23 May 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331.
11 See BernardM.Hoekman & Petros C.Mavroidis,The Dark Side of the Moon: ‘Completing’ theWTOContract
Through Adjudication, Nov. 2012, at 5, http://globalgovernanceprogramme.eui.eu/wp-content/uploads/
2012/11/Hoekman-Mavroidis-MESSERLIN-FEST_FIN.pdf.
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farewell speech, outgoing AB member Professor Van den Bossche recalled that in
his nine-plus years of service as an AB member, ‘[t]he most challenging
cases … were those regarding the balance struck in the relevant WTO agreement
between free trade and conflicting societal values’.12 This observation speaks to the
importance of ensuring that WTO judicial decisions maintain a balance between
trade liberalization and domestic autonomy, which therefore provides a useful
benchmark to identify cases of judicial overreach.
Section III discusses AB’s rulings under the Agreement on Technical Barriers
to Trade13 (TBT Agreement) in three major cases to examine whether these
rulings have amounted to judicial overreach. These cases include US – Clove
Cigarettes,14 US – Tuna II (Mexico)15 and two subsequent compliance proceedings
(i.e. US – Tuna II (Mexico)(Article 21.5) 16 and US – Tuna II (Mexico)(Article 21.5
II) 17), and EC – Seal Products.18 There are two main reasons for the focus on
TBT cases. First, the cases in which the US claimed judicial overreach largely fall
within two categories, namely, trade remedy and non-trade-remedy cases.19
While there have been rich discussions of judicial overreach in the trade remedy
cases,20 the same is not true for the non-trade-remedy cases which have mainly
12 WTO, Appellate Body, Farewell Speech of Appellate Body Member Peter Van den Bossche, (28 May 2019),
www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/farwellspeech_peter_van_den_bossche_e.htm.
13 Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization, Annex 1A, 1868 U.N.T.S. 120.
14 Appellate Body Report, United States – Measures Affecting the Production and Sale of Clove Cigarettes
(US – Clove Cigarettes), WT/DS406/AB/R (adopted 24 Apr. 2012).
15 Appellate Body Report, United States – Measures Concerning the Importation, Marketing and Sale of Tuna
and Tuna Products (US – Tuna II (Mexico)), WT/DS381/AB/R (adopted 13 June 2012).
16 Appellate Body Report, United States – Measures Concerning the Importation, Marketing and Sale of Tuna
and Tuna Products (Recourse to Art. 21.5 of the DSU by Mexico) [US – Tuna II (Mexico)(Art. 21.5)], WT/
DS381/AB/RW (adopted 3 Dec. 2015).
17 Appellate Body Report, United States – Measures Concerning the Importation, Marketing and Sale of Tuna
and Tuna Products, (Recourse to Art. 21.5 of the DSU by the United States) & (Second Recourse to Art. 21.5
of the DSU by Mexico), WT/DS381/RW/USA, WT/DS381/RW/2 (adopted 11 Jan. 2019). [here-
inafter US – Tuna II (Mexico)(Art. 21.5 II)].
18 Appellate Body Report, European Communities – Measures Prohibiting the Importation and Marketing of
Seal Products (EC – Seal Products), WT/DS400/AB/R, WT/DS401/AB/R (adopted 18 June 2014).
19 See Office of the United States Trade Representative, 2018 Trade Policy Agenda, supra n. 1, at 22–4.
Also see Terence P. Stewart, Can the WTO Be Saved from Itself? Not Without a Major Crisis, and Possibly
Not Even Then, Wash. Int’l Trade Ass’n (13 Apr. 2018), Attachment 1, www.stewartlaw.com/
Content/Documents/Terence%20Stewart%20-%20WITA%20paper%20(April%2013%202018).pdf.
20 See e.g. Roger P. Alford, Reflections on US – Zeroing: A Study in Judicial Overreaching by the WTO
Appellate Body, 45(1) Colum. J. Transnational L. 196 (2006); Michel Cartland, Gerard Depayre & Jan
Woznowski, Is Something Going Wrong in the WTO Dispute Settlement?, 46(5) J. of World Trade 979
(2012); Marc Benitah, China’s ‘Industrial Subsidies’: Is the WTO’s AB Jurisprudence About the Definition of
a ‘Public Body’ An Instance of the Worst Kind of Judicial Activism?, Int’l Econ. L. & Pol’y Blog (28 Mar.
2019), https://worldtradelaw.typepad.com/ielpblog/2019/05/chinas-industrial-subsidies-is-the-wtos-
ab-jurisprudence-about-definition-of-a-public-body-an-instan.html; Ru Ding, ‘“Public Body” or
Not: Chinese State-Owned Enterprise’, 48(1) J. of World Trade 167 (2014); Amrita Bahri,
‘Appellate Body Held Hostage’, Is Judicial Activism at Fair Trial?, 53(2) J. World Trade 293, 302–07
(2019).
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involved the TBT Agreement.21 Second, in all the selected TBT cases, the AB
was requested to determine whether the contested technical regulations were
designed to achieve certain non-protectionist policy objectives chosen by the
responding Members. This provides a proper framework for the discussion of
whether the AB rulings were ‘overreaching’ in light of the overarching function
of the WTO. After a careful examination of the AB’s interpretation of the
relevant provisions of the TBT Agreement and the outcomes of the cases, we
argue that the AB’s decisions did not lead to judicial overreach but were reason-
ably confined to fulfilling the underlying function of the WTO. That is, the
decisions have targeted the protectionist use of the policy instruments concerned
without unduly interfering in the Members’ pursuit of the non-protectionist
goals, thereby achieving a good balance between the disciplining of protectionist
measures and deference to domestic regulatory autonomy. Accordingly, at least
regarding the TBT cases, we believe that the US allegation of judicial overreach
is unfounded and has led to a misinterpretation of the AB rulings. Indeed, the
mere fact that a losing party disagrees with an interpretation/decision of the AB
does not necessarily mean that the AB has overstepped its authority.22 Rather,
‘one would have to stand legal analysis on its head to accuse the Appellate Body
of having “created” law.’23
Section IV addresses the larger problems relating to legislative failure of the
WTO and the lack of political check on decisions of the WTO tribunals.
While judicial overreach is an unfounded allegation in light of the overarching
function of the WTO, it reflects the entrenched frustration of the US about
these broader and more systematic issues. Recognizing that the alleged problem
of judicial overreach is just the symptom, not the root cause of the systemic
problems in the WTO, we propose several solutions which would help restore
a proper balance between the legislative and judicial functions of the WTO.
They focus, respectively, on the problematic practice of ‘constructive ambigu-
ity’ in treaty drafting, techniques to avoid politically sensitive questions in
dispute settlement, mechanisms to grant more autonomy to disputing parties,
and ways for the political bodies to exert more control on the decisions of
WTO tribunals.
Section V concludes this article.
21 For a notable exception in this regard, see generally Robert Howse, The World Trade Organization 20
Years On: Global Governance by Judiciary, 27(1) Eur. J. Int’l L. 9 (2016).
22 Lorand Bartels, The Separation of Powers in the WTO: How to Avoid Judicial Activism, 53(4) Int’l &
Comparative L. Quarterly 861, 868 (2004).
23 See Robert Hudec, Free Trade, Sovereignty, Democracy: The Future of the World Trade Organization, 1(2)
World Trade Rev. 211, 217 (2002). Also see Andrew Lang, The Judicial Sensibility of the WTO Appellate
Body, 27(4) Eur. J. of Int’l L. 1095 (2016).
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2 THE CONCEPT OF JUDICIAL OVERREACH
AND THE FUNDAMENTAL FUNCTION OF THE WTO
2.1 JUDICIAL ACTIVISM
In past decades, judicial activism – a term often used interchangeably with judicial
overreach – has acquired many distinct and sometimes contradictory meanings
when being applied and vigorously debated in domestic legal systems.24 Given its
various dimensions, a key unresolved issue in the debate is the precise boundaries
of judicial power or the criteria used to define activism amongst judges, scholars,
lawyers, politicians and other commentators and stakeholders.25
In this article, we consider one specific dimension of judicial activism where
courts make positive laws beyond their judicial power, thereby performing a role
that is assigned to the legislature. At the domestic level, this dimension is typically
embedded in a constitutional system based on separation of powers. Nevertheless,
the proper boundary between necessary judicial interpretation and development of
law and usurpation of judicial power remains controversial in many common law
jurisdictions.26 For instance, while some have suggested that ‘the most justified and
least dangerous way to practice judicial review’ in US courts is one based on the
structures of government embodied in the Constitution,27 others have shown that
the limits that the doctrine of separation of powers imposes on judicial review, and
whether a judicial decision has crossed the limits, is subject to different
interpretations.28 In practice, some have argued that in a democratic society,
judicial review ‘can only rise to this level of activism … when other political
forces have abdicated their role of directing social changes’.29 Others have
observed that judicial activism has been ‘used to induce public disapproval of a
court action that a politician opposes, but is powerless to overturn.’30
24 See generally Keenan D. Kmiec, The Origin and Current Meanings of ‘Judicial Activism’, 92(5) Cal. L. Rev.
1441 (2004); Alpheus Thomas Mason, Judicial Activism: Old and New, 55(3) Va. L. Rev. 385 (1969).
25 See generally Bradley C. Canon, Defining the Dimensions of Judicial Activism, 66(6) Judicature 236
(1983).
26 See Michael Kirby, Judicial Activism, 27(1) W. Austl. L. Rev. 1, 1–14 (1997). Under civil law legal systems,
the relationship between the judiciary and the legislature has also been hotly debated. While the relatively
limited judicial authority of civil law courts means that judges tend to be more conservative in performing
their judicial functions, the issue of judicial activism has arisen (especially in constitutional courts) and
generated similar difficulties in determining whether judges have overstepped their authority. See e.g. Susan
Gluck Mezey, Civil Law and Common Law Traditions: Judicial review and Legislative Supremacy in West
Germany and Canada, 32(3) Int’l & Comp. L. Q. 689 (1983); Hiroshi Itoh, Judicial Review and Judicial
Activism in Japan, 53(1) L. & Contemporary Prob. 169 (1990); Juliano Zaiden Benvindo, On the Limits of
Constitutional Adjudication: Deconstructing Balancing and Judicial Activism (Heidelberg: Springer 2010).
27 See generally Greg Jones, Proper Judicial Activism, 14(1) Regent Univ. L. Rev. 141 (2001).
28 See generally Frank M. Johnson, Jr., In Defense of Judicial Activism, 28(4) Emory L.J. 901 (1979).
29 See Wallace Mendelson, The Politics of Judicial Activism, 24(1) Emory L.J. 43 (1975).
30 See William Wayne Justice, The Two Faces of Judicial Activism, 61(1) The George Wash. L. Rev. 1
(1992).
956 JOURNAL OF WORLD TRADE
In the international arena, although the power of courts/judges tends to be
more limited as it must be delegated by Member States via treaties and exercised
with due deference to national sovereignty, there have been similar concerns about
activism due to the increasingly influential role of international tribunals ‘in
shaping the structure and content of international law’.31 The core problem is
how to draw a clear line between treaty interpretation for the settlement of
disputes and law-making by the judiciary. This problem typically arises when
judges of international courts are asked to address numerous complex legal claims
and lengthy technical submissions in accordance with a treaty that is often incom-
plete and open to more than one permissible interpretation. This difficulty is not
reduced by the application of internationally-recognized interpretative methods
which may lead to either an extensive or conservative interpretation.32 Indeed, it is
reasonable to argue that a proper judicial review must reflect the compromises
reached by the parties. However, such compromises are hard to identify due to the
wide range of divergent interests involved in treaty negotiations.33 The corollary is
that judicial activism is difficult to establish from a legal perspective.
More often than not, judges are criticized as being ‘activist’ for political
reasons (rather than for legal reasons), especially by losing parties who are unsa-
tisfied with the outcome of a case.34 Like in the domestic systems, such criticism
may reflect concern with the lack of effective mechanisms for political control that
could be utilized to overturn a judicial decision.35 This concern would become
increasingly severe if Member States fail to further clarify or develop the existing
treaty rules – i.e. a failure of the legislative function of an international organiza-
tion – while tribunals have to apply these rules to disputes involving cutting-edge
and politically sensitive issues. This means that regardless of whether judges take
more ‘activist’ or ‘self-restraint’ approaches to judicial interpretation, they do need
judicial discretion and autonomy to properly serve their functions.36 However, to
maintain the legitimacy of an international tribunal, we need to strike a balance
between rule of law and legalization on the one hand, and the political demands of
states and legislation on the other.37
31 See Fuad Zarbiyev, Judicial Activism in International Law – A Conceptual Framework for Analysis, 3(2) J.
Int’l Dispute Settlement 247, 248 (2012).
32 Ibid., at 253–54.
33 Ibid., at 260.
34 Ibid., at 252.
35 Ibid., at 263.
36 See generally Pieter Kooijmans, The ICJ in the 21st Century: Judicial Restraint, Judicial Activism, or
Proactive Judicial Policy, 56(4) Int’l & Comparative L. Q. 741 (2007); Dragoljub Popovic, Prevailing of
Judicial Activism over Self-Restraint in the Jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights, 42 Creighton
L. Rev. 361 (2009).
37 See generally Robert O. Keohane, Andrew Moravcsik & Anne-Marie Slaughter, Legalized Dispute
Resolution: Interstate and Transnational, 54(3) Int’l Org. 457 (2000); Richard H. Steinberg, Judicial
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Since its birth, the WTO has faced many challenges to its legitimacy.38 As far
as the AB is concerned, judicial activism has been one of the major criticisms.
However, like in domestic or other international courts, the boundary between
judicial interpretation and judicial legislation is not clearly delineated under the
WTO treaty. Indeed, Article 3.2 of the DSU sets out the key mandates of the AB
as ‘providing security and predictability to the multilateral trading system’ and
‘clarify[ing] the existing provisions of those agreements in accordance with cus-
tomary rules of interpretation of public international law’. It also imposes a
constraint that in fulfilling these mandates the AB must not ‘add to or diminish
the rights and obligations in the covered agreements.’ Thus, the AB’s judicial
power is limited to treaty interpretation that clarifies the rights and obligations
agreed by Members and does not include creating such rights or obligations.
However, the considerable loopholes or ambiguities in WTO rules make it
extremely difficult to ascertain what the agreed rights and obligations should be.
While it is settled that the general rules of treaty interpretation contemplated in the
VCLT should be applied in the interpretation of WTO agreements, the AB’s
application of these rules in individual disputes has been regularly criticized as
being too conservative or creative and sometimes contradictory.39 Moreover, the
application of VCLT rules does not always lead to a definite interpretation and
therefore is susceptible to criticism that another permissible interpretation should
apply.40 Given these legal uncertainties and controversies, the tension between the
judicial and legislative powers under the WTO is unavoidable despite the over-
arching boundary contemplated in Article 3.2 of the DSU.
Yet, in many disputes the tension is more about the political impacts of a
decision than about judicial law-making. While an AB decision is jurisprudentially
important and necessary for the resolution of disputes, it often has significant and
Lawmaking at the WTO: Discursive, Constitutional, and Political Constraints, 98(2) Am. J. of Int’l L. 247
(2004).
38 See e.g. Daniel C. Esty, The World Trade Organization’s Legitimacy Crisis, 1(1) World Trade Rev. 7
(2002); Joshua Meltzer, The Challenges to the World Trade Organization: It’s All About Legitimacy,
Brookings Global Econ. & Development Policy Paper 2011–04 (19 Apr. 2011), www.brookings.
edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/0419_world_trade_organization_meltzer.pdf.
39 See generally Isabelle Van Damme, Treaty Interpretation by the WTO Appellate Body, 21(3) Eur. J. of Int’l
L. 605 (2010); Hoekman & Mavroidis, supra n. 11, at 9–14. For a comprehensive discussion of treaty
interpretation in the WTO, see generally Asif H. Qureshi, Interpreting WTO Agreements: Problems and
Perspectives (Cambridge: 2nd ed., CUP 2015).
40 See Petros C. Mavroidis, Crisis? What Crisis? Is the WTO Appellate Body Coming of Age? in Opportunities
and Obligations: New Perspectives on Global and US Trade Policy 173, 176 (Terence P. Steward (eds),
Netherlands: Kluwer Law International 2009). For examples of unresolved interpretations based on
VCLT rules, see e.g. Weihuan Zhou, The Role of Regulatory Purpose Under Articles III:2 & 4 – Toward
Consistency Between Negotiating History and WTO Jurisprudence, 11(1) World Trade Rev. 81, 83–7
(2012); Weihuan Zhou & Delei Peng, EU – Price Comparison Methodologies (DS516): Challenging the
Non-Market Economy Methodology in Light of the Negotiating History of Article 15 of China’s WTO Accession
Protocol, 52(3) J. of World Trade 505, 509–18 (2018).
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immediate political implications especially for losing parties. In reality, it is not
uncommon for an AB decision to attract considerable political resistance from a
losing party, although whether the decision has undermined the original compro-
mises established by trade negotiators is often debatable. The consequence is that
there is a political need for disputing parties to speak against unfavourable rulings in
response to their domestic constituents, typically based on allegations that the AB’s
interpretation is legally erroneous and has affected the agreed compromises under-
pinning WTO rules. Thus, the AB operates in such ‘dual legal and political
environments’.41 To promote the international rule of law, predictability, certainty
and fairness without risking political backlashes, the AB has to constantly juggle
diverse and sometimes competing interests, such as treaty interpretation, dispute
resolution, judicial independence and political and legislative demands.42
Building upon the VCLT rules, several self-restraint techniques have been
proposed for the AB to minimize political repercussions. For example, one early
US proposal recommended that the AB adopt a strictly ‘textualist’ interpretative
approach to avoid filling gaps or clarifying ambiguities that were left deliberately by
negotiators in WTO agreements.43 Commentators have observed that in certain
highly sensitive cases, the AB did exercise self-restraint by employing deferential
doctrines such as in dubio mitius whereby an ambiguous treaty term shall be
interpreted in a way that minimizes burden on states.44 They have also suggested
that in dealing with such cases the AB may also consider ‘avoidance techniques’
such as judicial economy and non-justiciability to ‘diminish the probability of
severe political correction.’45
While the AB has often employed VCLT rules for treaty interpretation, it has
shown a strong inclination for gap-filling and ambiguity clarification, which is
often achieved through considerable judicial creativity. This choice of a more
‘activist’ and less deferential approach has become the core source of the concerns
about judicial activism. Nevertheless, whether the AB’s approach has fundamen-
tally and adversely shifted the balance of rights and obligations between WTO
41 See Cosette D. Creamer, Between the Letter of the Law and the Demands of Politics: Judicial Balancing of
Trade Authority Within the WTO, University of Minnesota Working Paper 2017, at 2, https://scholar.
harvard.edu/files/cosettecreamer/files/creamer_jls_v2.pdf.
42 See Steinberg, supra n. 37, at 267. For a more generalized piece on the values and norms of
international courts, see Jeffrey L. Dunoff & Mark A. Pollack, The Judicial Trilemma, 111(2) Am. J.
Int’l L. 225 (2017).
43 See WTO, TN/DS/W/82/Add.1, supra n. 7.
44 See Steinberg, supra n. 37, at 258–59; Robert Hudec, Free Trade, Sovereignty, Democracy: The Future of
the World Trade Organization, 1(2) World Trade Rev. 211, 215 (2002). For a discussion of some of
these techniques, see Lorand Bartels, The Separation of Powers in the WTO: How to Avoid Judicial
Activism, 53(4) Int’l & Comparative L. Quarterly 861, 868–77 (2004).
45 See Steinberg, supra n. 37, at 269. For a comprehensive discussion of the use of these techniques in
early WTO cases, see generally William J. Davey, Has the WTO Dispute Settlement System Exceeded Its
Authority?, 4(1) J. Int’l Econ. L. 79 (2001).
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Members remains debatable.46 It is also not clear as to whether the use of more
deferential techniques would allow the AB to effectively avoid political repercus-
sions without sacrificing its judicial function.
Faced with the legal and political complexities embedded in this ongoing
accusation of the AB, there is a pressing need to establish workable standards/
criteria for an objective assessment of the issue of judicial activism. The persistent
absence of such standards has created an environment that has facilitated mis-
interpretations of AB rulings and unfounded allegations of judicial overreach,
which have in turn led to misunderstandings of and hence opposition to the
judicial approaches and decisions of the AB.
2.2 ASSESSING JUDICIAL ACTIVISM IN LIGHT OF THE FUNCTION OF THE WTO
One useful way to assess whether the AB has overstepped its delegated authority in
interpreting WTO rules is to assess its decisions in light of the fundamental
function of the WTO. Where the application of VCLT rules permits different
interpretations, whether the AB’s interpretation is ‘overreaching’ would be hard to
determine by merely relying on the legality of the interpretation(s). However, the
AB’s interpretation should not be treated as ‘overreaching’ if it serves the under-
lying function of the WTO.
While the fundamental function of the WTO remains a subject of debate,47
classic theorems of free trade and public choice offer a powerful and influential
explanation of why the rules-based trading system is designed to discipline the
choice of trade policies and policy instruments by governments in pursuit of
various policy objectives.
This function may be expounded briefly as follows.48 The doctrine of com-
parative advantage, which demonstrates the economic benefits of free trade, merely
46 See Steinberg, supra n. 37, at 269–73.
47 For a comprehensive analysis of literature on an array of proposed rationales for the formation of the
WTO, see WTO, World Trade Report: Six Decades of Multilateral Trade Cooperation: What Have We
Learnt? 50–98 (Geneva: WTO 2007).
48 The explanation of the relevant theories draws on some of the most seminal works and their
subsequent developments, such as, Douglas A. Irwin, Against the Tide: An Intellectual History of Free
Trade (New Jersey: Princeton University Press 1996); Anthony Downs, An Economic Theory of
Democracy (New York: Harper & Brothers 1957); Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action: Public
Goods and the Theory of Groups (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press 1965); Gene M.
Grossman & Elhanan Helpman, Protection for Sale 84(4) Am. Econ. Rev. 833 (1994); Kenneth W.
Abbott, The Trading Nation’s Dilemma: The Functions of the Law of International Trade 26(2) Harv. Int’l L.
J. 501 (1985); Ernst-Ulrish Petersmann, Constitutional Functions and Constitutional Problems of
International Economic Law 95–138 (Fribourg, Switzerland: Westview Press 1991); Richard
Blackhurst, The Economic Effects of Different Types of Trade Measures and Their Impact on Consumers in
International Trade and the Consumer 94–111 (OECD, Paris, 1986); Peter H. Lindert, International
Economics (Illinois: 8th ed., Richard Irwin 1986) Ch. 6.
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establishes a case for unilateral liberalization but not necessarily trade cooperation.
Instead, the need for international cooperation on trade regulations arises from the
politics of trade. To maximize the chances of retaining power, politicians are
highly tempted by short-term political gains obtainable from granting protection
to influential constituencies (i.e. importing-competing industries v. consumers),
even though they recognize the longer-term economic gains from trade liberal-
ization and economic costs of protection. Consequently, in their choice of trade
policies and policy instruments, they are prone to choosing the ones that afford
higher protection and are typically more trade-restrictive and distortive from an
economic perspective.
The creation of a rules-based system for trade cooperation incorporates the
interests of exporters into the domestic decision-making process, which counter-
acts the protectionist pressure on policy-making and makes it politically costly to
deviate from economically efficient and transparent policy instruments.49 The
system creates strong incentives for exporters to lobby for reciprocal trade liberal-
ization, that is, the opening-up of their own market in exchange for enhanced
access to foreign markets. WTO rules regulate the choice of trade policies and
policy instruments in a way that largely conforms to the guide of economic
theories.50 As such, these rules promote the use of less-trade-restrictive and more
economically efficient policy instruments to achieve policy objectives.
However, one major qualification for this function of the WTO is that
the system does not require Members to sacrifice ‘the pursuit of any economic
or social policy goal’ for the pursuit of free trade.51 From an economic
perspective, trade liberalization may not be an economically viable policy if
governments are restricted from addressing domestic externalities/objectives.
Instead, it could be welfare-enhancing if the externalities/objectives are
tackled through first-best policy instruments that attack directly the source
49 See generally Jan Tumlir, International Economic Order: Rules, Co-operation and Sovereignty in Issues in
International Economics 1–15 (Peter Oppenheimer (eds), Stocksfield, Northumberland, England: Oriel
Press Ltd., 1980); Frieder Roessler, The Scope, Limits and Function of the GATT Legal System, 8(3) The
World Econ. 287 (1985). See also Robert Hudec, Circumventing Democracy: The Political Morality of
Trade Negotiations 25(2) N.Y.U. J. Int’l L. & Pol. 311, 316 (1993); Kenneth W. Dam, Cordell Hull, the
Reciprocal Trade Agreement Act, and the WTO in Reforming the World Trading System: Legitimacy,
Efficiency, and Democratic Governance 83, 96 (Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann (eds), Oxford, New York:
Oxford University Press 2005).
50 See generally Frieder Roessler, The Constitutional Function of the Multilateral Trade Order in National
Constitutions and International Economic Law 53–62 (Meinhard Hilf & Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann (eds),
Deventer, The Netherlands: Kluwer 1993). See also Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, National Constitutions
and International Economic Law in National Constitutions and International Economic Law 3–52, 47–8
(Meinhard Hilf & Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann (eds), Deventer, Boston: Kluwer Law and Taxation
Publishers 1993).
51 See e.g. Petersmann, supra n. 48, at 230; Roessler, supra n. 49, at 294; Alan O. Sykes, Regulatory
Protectionism and the Law of International Trade, 66(1) The Univ. Chi. L. Rev. 1, 6–7, 23 (1999).
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of each externality/objective.52 From a political perspective, when nations
decide to relinquish aspects of their sovereignty to the WTO to make inter-
national trade rules collectively, it is unlikely that their intention is to
empower the WTO to decide on their behalf what non-trade objectives
would be legitimate.53 Thus, a WTO dispute settlement decision that unduly
impairs Members’ capacity in pursuing domestic policy goals would be eco-
nomically and politically undesirable. Accordingly, the WTO’s function of
disciplining the use of policy instruments should not amount to an undesirable
impediment to Members’ pursuit of legitimate policy objectives.
The application of this function to the assessment of judicial activism means
that the key consideration would be whether an AB decision achieves a proper
balance between the regulation of protectionist policy instruments and the flex-
ibility for Members to pursue non-trade interests. Significantly, this approach goes
beyond the legality of a decision and allows for an evaluation of its economic and
political soundness. It therefore encapsulates the foundation of the multilateral
trading system and offers a systemic way to determine judicial activism.
3 THE LEGITIMACY OF AB DECISIONS IN TBT CASES
Generally speaking, the AB has demonstrated a good understanding of the under-
lying function of the WTO and the economic and political implications of its
decisions. In various rulings, the AB has drawn a distinction between policy
objectives and policy instruments stressing repeatedly that what WTO rules seek
to regulate are the instruments and that its decisions should not be taken as
restricting Members’ freedom of attaining non-trade policy goals.54 These rulings
suggest that, in principle, the AB has taken a coherent and balanced approach in
disputes involving non-trade interests.
The AB’s approach, however, has not dispelled growing concerns over judicial
activism. Under the TBT Agreement, US concerns have centred on the AB’s
52 See generally Jagdish N. Bhagwati, The Generalized Theory of Distortions and Welfare in Trade Balance of
Payments and Growth: Papers in International Economics in Honor of Charles P. Kindleberger 69–90 (Jagdish
N. Bhagwati et al. (eds), Amsterdam London: North-Holland Publishing Co. 1971). For a compre-
hensive review of the historical development and application of the theory of distortions, see Jagdish N.
Bhagwati, Free Trade Today (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press 2002).
53 See e.g. Ming Michael Du, The Rise of National Regulatory Autonomy in the GATT/WTO Regime, 14(3)
J. Int’l Econ. L. 639, 644 (2011).
54 See e.g. Panel Report, United States – Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, WT/DS2/R
(adopted 20 May 1996), para. 7.1; Appellate Body Report, United States – Standards for Reformulated and
Conventional Gasoline, WT/DS2/AB/R 29–30 (adopted 20 May 1996); Appellate Body Report,
Australia – Measures Affecting Importation of Salmon, WT/DS18/AB/R (adopted 6 Nov. 1998), paras
199–200; Appellate Body Report, Brazil – Measures Affecting Imports of Retreaded Tyres, WT/DS332/
AB/R (adopted 17 Dec. 2007), para. 140.
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interpretation of the non-discrimination rules contemplated under Article 2.1.55 In
US – Clove Cigarettes, the very first dispute in which the non-discrimination principle
was interpreted, the US criticized the AB’s rulings as second-guessing the judgment
of US regulators without solid evidence and failing to pay due regard to the different
regulatory considerations involved.56 In US – Tuna II (Mexico), the immediately
subsequent dispute in which the AB adopted and applied the same interpretative
approach, the US raised similar concerns and reiterated that WTO tribunals are not
equipped to question complex regulatory considerations of Member States.57 In
contrast, in EC – Seal Products, in which the AB ruled against the EC’s discrimina-
tory measures for the protection of animal welfare, the EC did not challenge the
AB’s authority and competence to judge the WTO-lawfulness of its measures and
the US implicitly endorsed the AB’s rulings as being reasonably deferential.58 The
different attitudes of the US in these disputes suggest that its claim of judicial
overreach may have more to do with the political implications of losing disputes
than with the actual legal approach and standards developed by the AB. To further
examine the validity of the US allegations of judicial overreach in light of the
fundamental function of the WTO, we provide a brief analysis of the AB decisions
in these cases below.
3.1 US – Clove Cigarettes
The US measure involved in Clove Cigarettes was a prohibition of cigarettes with
characterizing flavours other than tobacco or menthol. This measure affected
Indonesia, the largest exporter of clove cigarettes to the US. Under Article 2.1
of the TBT Agreement, the AB upheld the panel’s findings that menthol and clove
cigarettes were ‘like products’ and that by banning imported clove cigarettes but
not menthol cigarettes of US origin, the measure had a disparate impact on the
imports in favour of the domestic goods.59 The legality of the measure, conse-
quently, hinged on whether it served the claimed policy objective of reducing
youth smoking by prohibiting the manufacture and sale of cigarettes with certain
‘characterizing flavours’ that appeal to youth. After a careful interpretation of the
term ‘less favourable treatment’ based on the VCLT rules, the AB established a test
of whether the disparate impact of the measure ‘stems exclusively from a legitimate
55 See Office of the United States Trade Representative, 2018 Trade Policy Agenda, supra n. 1, at 23.
56 WTO, Dispute Settlement Body, Minutes of Meeting on 24 Apr. 2012, WT/DSB/M/315 15–6 (27
June 2012).
57 WTO, Dispute Settlement Body, Minutes of Meeting on 13 June 2012, WT/DSB/M/317 6 (31 July
2012).
58 WTO, Dispute Settlement Body, Minutes of Meeting on 18 June 2014, WT/DSB/M/346 21–2 (28
Aug. 2014).
59 See Appellate Body Report, US – Clove Cigarettes, supra n. 14, paras 131–32, 144–45, 160, 222.
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regulatory distinction rather than reflecting discrimination against the group of
imported products’.60 This test may be seen as a Rationality Test because the key
issue is whether the discrimination has a rational connection with the chosen
objective. If such a connection is lacking, then the discrimination is most likely a
disguised protectionist instrument. Applying this test, the AB found that the US
measure was unjustifiable as it was not even-handed in the pursuit of the chosen
objective by excluding ‘menthol cigarettes, which similarly contain flavours and
ingredients that increase the attractiveness of tobacco to youth, from the ban on
flavoured cigarettes.’61 The US offered two explanations for the exemption of
menthol cigarettes: to avoid (1) ‘the potential impact on the US health care system
associated with the need to treat “millions” of menthol cigarette addicts with
withdrawal symptoms’, and (2) ‘the risk of development of a black market and
smuggling to supply the needs of menthol cigarette smokers’.62 The AB rejected
these explanations as there was no proof that the risks ‘would materialize if
menthol cigarettes were to be banned, insofar as regular cigarettes would remain
in the market.’63
As will be shown below, the WTO tribunals applied the Rationality Test to assess
whether a discriminatory measure was justifiable in the subsequent TBT cases. This
test, however, has been controversial. The latest and most comprehensive criticism of
the US was presented in the meeting of the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) where
the reports of the second compliance panel and the AB in US – Tuna II (Mexico)(Article
21.5 II) were adopted. While the AB ultimately ruled in favour of the US, the US
forcefully challenged the AB’s interpretation of the non-discrimination rules on two
major grounds, contending that the Rationality Test (1) finds no textual support in the
TBT Agreement, and (2) has imposed unreasonably high standards/burdens for
Members to satisfy in designing and applying domestic regulations and hence ‘would
diminish WTO Members’ rights to pursue legitimate and important public policy
measures.’64 Scholars are also divided on the reasonableness of the test.65 For the
60 Ibid., paras 167–82.
61 Ibid., paras 225, 236.
62 Ibid., para. 225.
63 Ibid.
64 US Mission to International Organizations in Geneva, Statements by the United States at the Jan. 11
DSB Meeting, at 3–16, https://geneva.usmission.gov/wp-content/uploads/sites/290/Jan11.DSB_.
Stmt_.as-deliv.fin_.pdf.
65 See e.g. Petros C. Mavroidis, Driftin’ Too Far from Shore – Why the Test for Compliance with the TBT
Agreement Developed by the WTO Appellate Body Is Wrong, and What Should the AB Have Done
Instead, 12(3) World Trade Rev. 509 (2013); Gabrielle Marceau, The New TBT Jurisprudence in
US – Clove Cigarettes, WTO US – Tuna II, and US – Cool, 8(1) Asian J. of WTO & Int’l Health
L. & Pol’y 1 (2013); Weihuan Zhou, US-Clove Cigarettes and US-Tuna II (Mexico): Implications for
the Role of Regulatory Purpose under Article III:4 of the GATT, 15(4) J. Int’l Econ. L. 1075 (2012);
Emily Lydgate, Is It Rational and Consistent? The WTO’s Surprising Role in Shaping Domestic Public
Policy, 20(3) J. of Int’l Econ. L. 561 (2017).
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purpose of this article, a detailed examination of the different academic positions
would be unnecessary. Rather, it would suffice to note that the debate over the
Rationality Test lends support to the view that the application of the VCLT rules may
well lead to more than one permissible interpretation. However, the fact that the AB
has adopted one of the permissible interpretations to which others disagree does not
mean that the AB’s interpretation is ‘overreaching’. Instead, it suggests that judicial
overreaching cannot be adequately evaluated solely based on legal interpretations but
requires a consideration of the broader implications of the AB’s interpretation.
In light of the underlying function of the WTO, we discuss the implications of
the Clove Cigarettes decision by explaining how the AB sought to strike a balance
between disciplining of protectionist policy instruments and deference to domestic
autonomy. While questioning the discriminatory effect of the US measure, the AB did
not rule against the measure as a whole. This leaves flexibility for the US to maintain
the ban as long as the discrimination is removed. Moreover, the AB considered the
US’s explanations for the exclusion of menthol cigarettes from the ban, thereby leaving
room for Members to justify discrimination based on reasons other than stated policy
objectives. However, any such justifications rely heavily on evidence. In Clove
Cigarettes, the evidence adduced by the US failed to substantiate the need for the
discrimination to achieve the public health goal (as clove and menthol cigarettes are
equally addictive) or to avoid the declared side effects on the US health care system
and the tobacco market.66 Since the discrimination was not rationally connected with
the policy objective, it made the US ban less economically efficient and more
distortive in addressing the negative externalities associated with the consumption of
cigarettes. The fact that the discrimination isolated domestic menthol cigarettes from
foreign competition without serving the claimed policy objective provided a strong
indicator that the sole purpose behind it was to afford protection to the domestic
industry involved.67 The existence of strong protectionist pressures behind the US’s
choice of policy response to the health goal was also evident from the fact that the US
was politically unable to comply with the AB rulings by either lifting the ban on clove
cigarettes or extending it to menthol cigarettes. Instead, the US convinced Indonesia
to enter into a mutually agreed solution to the dispute, buying time to address
domestic political resistance to WTO compliance which would adversely affect the
vested interests of the US tobacco industry.68
66 See e.g. Tania Voon, United States – Measures Affecting the Production and Sale of Clove Cigarettes, 106(4)
Am.n J. Int’l L. 824, 828 (2012).
67 SeeMavroidis, supra n. 65, at 526; Tomer Broude & Philip I. Levy, Do You Mind if I Don’t Smoke? Products,
Purpose and Indeterminacy in US – Measures Affecting the Production and Sale of Clove Cigarettes, 13(2) World
Trade Rev. 357, 389 (2014); Simon Lester, Domestic Tobacco Regulation and International Law: The Interaction
of Trade Agreements and the Framework Convention on Tobacco Control, 49(1) J. of World Trade 19, 30 (2015).
68 See William K. Watson, As Expected, WTO Clove Cigarettes Case Goes Nowhere, Cato Institute (8 Oct.
2014), www.cato.org/blog/expected-wto-clove-cigarette-case-goes-nowhere. For a critical analysis of
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Thus, the Rationality Test and the AB’s application of it in Clove Cigarettes do
not seem ‘overreaching’. Contrary to US accusations, the AB did not overstep its
authority by engaging in a ‘cost and benefit’ assessment of the US measure on
behalf of US regulators. All the AB did was to compel the US to remove the
discriminatory element of the measure which evidently reflects the protectionist
influence of the import-competing industry. In the meantime, the AB left con-
siderable policy space for the US to pursue its public health policy without
requiring it to comply in a particular way or ignoring any other reasonable
regulatory considerations that it may have. By doing so, the AB’s decision struck
a proper balance between disciplining protectionism while allowing regulatory
autonomy.
3.2 US – Tuna II (Mexico)
The measure involved in Tuna II (Mexico) – i.e. the US ‘dolphin-safe’ labelling
scheme – had a similar discriminatory element as that of the US tobacco ban but in
a more covert form. Under the scheme, tuna products were categorized based on
the technique employed in tuna-harvesting and the area where tuna was harvested.
Specifically, a regulatory distinction was made between tuna products containing
tuna harvested in the Eastern Tropical Pacific Ocean (ETP) using purse seine nets
and those containing tuna harvested outside the ETP using techniques other than
setting on dolphins. The scheme imposed a number of different requirements on
the two categories of tuna products to determine their eligibility for a ‘dolphin-
safe’ label. The major issue was that the requirements applied to the former
regulatory category, within which almost all Mexican tuna products fell, were
more onerous than those applied to the latter category which covered almost all
US tuna products. Thus, the measure was found to have an asymmetric impact on
the competitive opportunities of Mexican tuna products in the US market.69 In
assessing the US’s claim that the measure served to inform consumers and protect
dolphins, the AB applied the Rationality Test and concluded that the discrimina-
tory treatment of Mexican tuna products in favour of their US counterparts was
unjustifiable. In reaching this conclusion, the AB relied on evidence showing that
the US measure did not address the harms to dolphins associated with the use of
techniques other than setting on dolphins in tuna-fishing outside the ETP.70
the settlement of the dispute and its implications for the DSM, see Johannes Norpoth, The Mutually
Agreed Solution between Indonesia and the United States in US – Clove Cigarettes: A Case of Efficient Breach
(or Power Politics)? in International Economic Law: Contemporary Issues 129–47 (Giovanna Adinolfi et al.
(eds), Switzerland: Springer 2017).
69 See Appellate Body Report, US – Tuna II (Mexico), supra n. 15, paras 234–35.
70 Ibid., paras 251, 288.
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Therefore, the measure was not even-handed in addressing the same risks to
dolphins and hence had no rational connection with the declared objective.71
However, the AB endorsed the necessity of the labelling scheme as a whole for the
pursuit of the chosen objective essentially on the ground that there was no less
trade restrictive means that could achieve the level of protection pursued by the
scheme.72
To implement the AB rulings, the US amended the labelling scheme by
strengthening the requirements applicable to tuna products containing tuna caught
outside the ETP by techniques other than setting on dolphins.73 However, the revised
scheme maintained the same regulatory distinction and did not completely remedy the
discriminatory requirements; consequently, in the first compliance proceedings the AB
found that certain provisions of the revised scheme still lacked evenhandedness.74
Subsequently, the US further strengthened the requirements on the same regulatory
category to specifically address the deficiencies found by the first compliance tribunal.
In the second compliance proceedings, based on the panel’s thorough risk assessment
of the different fishing activities which concluded that setting on dolphins causes more
and higher harms compared with other fishing methods, the AB upheld the panel’s
finding that the further revised scheme was ‘calibrated to the risks to dolphins arising
from the use of different fishing methods in different areas of the ocean.’75
Like in Clove Cigarettes, the AB’s dissatisfaction with the US ‘dolphin-safe’
labelling scheme was narrowly focused on the discriminatory element of the scheme.
As part of a comprehensive regulatory framework adopted by the US to protect
dolphins, the labelling scheme was introduced to strengthen the existing framework by
targeting the consumption of tuna in response to overwhelming public pressure.76
There is evidence to show that the scheme was effective in changing the behaviour of
consumers and producers in a way that reduced the harms to dolphins.77 Thus, in the
71 Ibid., paras 297–99.
72 Ibid., paras 328, 330.
73 Dispute Settlement Body, Minutes of Meeting held on 23 July 2013 (WT/DSB/M/334, 2 Oct. 2013),
para. 1.51.
74 See Appellate Body Report, US – Tuna II (Mexico)(Art. 21.5), supra n. 16, paras 6.7–34, 7.231–266.
75 See Panel Report, United States – Measures Concerning the Importation, Marketing and Sale of Tuna and
Tuna Products (Recourse to Art. 21.5 of the DSU by the United States) & (Second Recourse to Art. 21.5 of the
DSU by Mexico), WT/DS381/RW/USA, WT/DS381/RW/2, adopted 11 Jan. 2019, paras 7.164–
717; Appellate Body Report, US – Tuna II (Mexico)(Art. 21.5 II), supra n. 17, paras 6.33–258.
76 See Rodrigo Fagundes Cezar, The Politics of ‘Dolphin-Safe’ Tuna in the United States: Policy Change and
Reversal, Lock-in and Adjustment to International Constraints (1984–2017), 17(4) World Trade Rev. 635,
642–45 (2018).
77 See e.g. Mario Teisl, Brian Roe & Robert Hicks, Can Eco-Labels Tune a Market? Evidence from Dolphin-
Safe Labeling, 43(3) J.of Envtl Econ. & Mgmt. 339 (2002); Lorraine Mitchell, Dolphin-Safe Tuna
Labeling in Economics of Food Labeling 25 (Golan, Kuchler and Mitchell (eds), Washington DC:
Agricultural Economic Report No. 793, US Department of Agriculture 2000); Panel Report,
United States – Measures Concerning the Importation, Marketing and Sale of Tuna and Tuna Products,
WT/DS381/R, adopted 13 June 2012, paras 7.320–331.
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original proceedings, the AB rightly endorsed the overall legitimacy and effectiveness
of the scheme and paid due deference to the level of protection that the US chose to
achieve by rejecting the alternate scheme established under the Agreement on the
International Dolphin Conservation Program (AIDCP) which could merely offer a
lower level of protection. However, the evidence before the tribunal did not provide a
valid reason for why the two categories of tuna products should be subject to different
labelling requirements when the fishing activities at issue tend to create similar risks to
dolphins. In other words, the discrimination could not be explained by the policy
objective that the US sought to achieve. Thus, the AB pushed the US to gradually
narrow the differences in the labelling requirements between the regulatory categories
so that the scheme became less discriminatory and protective. If one considers the
scheme as an instrument to address information asymmetries in the US market as to
whether tuna products are produced in a dolphin-friendly manner,78 the revised
scheme addressed this externality and hence the ultimate goal of protecting dolphins
more closely.
In short, the AB’s decision was reasonably focused on disciplining the protectionist
element of the US scheme and was not overly intrusive into the policy space of the US
in protecting dolphins. It provided flexibility for the US to maintain a comprehensive
regulatory framework using a mix of policy instruments including the labelling scheme
based on the regulatory distinction to achieve its desired level of protection. In addition,
it also left room for the US to tackle the same production externality of different sizes in
different ways, that is, to apply different labelling requirements under the different
regulatory categories in response to larger risks to dolphins. While the labelling scheme
involved a variety of political considerations, the AB’s decision was solely aimed at
counteracting the protectionist influence on environmental policies without impairing
the capacity of the US government to respond to the interests of environmental
groups.79 Indeed, the likely effect of the decision was to provide an international
constraint necessary for the US to overcome domestic protectionist pressures and
improve the labelling scheme to enhance the protection of dolphins.80
3.3 EC – seal products
Seal Products concerned the EU’s seal regime which imposed a ban on the
importation and sale of seal products in EU markets. The regime, however, created
several exemptions with the major one being the so-called IC exception which
78 SeeMeredith Crowley & Robert Howse, Tuna-Dolphin II: A Legal and Economic Analysis of the Appellate
Body Report, 13(2) World Trade Rev. 321, 343 (2014).
79 For an analysis of the politics behind the evolvement of the US labelling scheme, see generally Cezar,
supra n. 76.
80 Ibid., at 658–59.
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excluded seal products obtained from seals hunted by Inuit or indigenous com-
munities from the ban. The evidence before the panel showed that the exception
was made available exclusively to Greenlandic IC hunts and consequently had a
disparate impact on Canadian and Norwegian seal products vis-à-vis those origi-
nating in Greenland.81 The complexity of the dispute arose from the fact that the
seal regime was apparently designed to serve multiple objectives. According to the
EU, the ban served to address public moral concerns about inhumane killing of
seals and consumption of commercially-hunted seal products, and the IC excep-
tion sought to preserve the tradition and culture of indigenous people. However,
the panel found that the IC exception had no rational connection with the
objective of protecting seal welfare and therefore violated Article 2.1 of the TBT
Agreement and constituted ‘unjustifiable and arbitrary discrimination’ under the
Chapeau of GATT Article XX.82 But the panel did accept that the regime as a
whole was necessary to achieve the objective under Article 2.2 of the TBT
Agreement because the alternative means proposed by the complainants would
be less effective and unreasonably burdensome for the EU.83 On appeal, the AB
did not consider the panel’s reasoning and findings under Articles 2.1 and 2.2 of
the TBT Agreement after it reversed the panel’s finding that the EU regime was a
‘technical regulation’ under the TBT Agreement.84 Nevertheless, the AB upheld
the panel’s rulings that the IC exception cannot be reconciled with the moral
objective and that the EU could have done more to address seal welfare in the
context of IC hunts.85 The AB further ruled that the EU could improve the
criteria of the IC exception to avoid arbitrary application that exempts commercial
hunts, and should have made ‘comparable efforts’ to facilitate the access of
Canadian Inuit to the IC exception as it did for the Greenlandic Inuit.86
The most controversial part of the AB’s decision in Seal Products is perhaps
whether it has restricted the policy space that the EU needs to address multiple,
competing non-trade interests. The moral objective of the ban and the preserva-
tion objective of the IC exception are conflicting to the extent that the latter
created ‘loopholes that might admit products of commercial hunts’.87 We believe
that the AB’s rulings are not unduly restrictive but have left sufficient policy space
81 Panel Report, European Communities – Measures Prohibiting the Importation and Marketing of Seal Products
(EC – Seal Products), WT/DS400/R, WT/DS401/R, adopted 18 June 2014, paras 7.157–170, 7.290–
319, 7.592–609.
82 Ibid., paras 7.618–651.
83 Ibid., paras 7.478–505.
84 See Appellate Body Report, EC – Seal Products, supra n. 18, paras 5.8–70.
85 Ibid., para. 5.320.
86 Ibid., paras 5.337–338.
87 Rob Howse, Joanna Langille & Katie Sykes, Sealing the Deal: The WTO’s Appellate Body Report in
EC – Seal Products, 18(12) ASIL Insights (2014), www.asil.org/insights/volume/18/issue/12/sealing-
deal-wto%E2%80%99s-appellate-body-report-ec-%E2%80%93-seal-products.
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for the EU. As in the previous two cases, what the AB was concerned about was
the discriminatory effect of the IC exception. Neither the moral objective nor the
preservation objective could explain sufficiently why the IC exception was not
applied in an even-handed manner. On the one hand, the effectiveness of the EU
regime to the accomplishment of the moral objective was clearly reduced by the
IC exception.88 On the other, the exclusion of IC hunts other than the
Greenlandic Inuit failed to afford equal protection of the rights of indigenous
communities in all the parties involved. Accordingly, the discriminatory design and
application of the IC exception resulted in a less efficient position in which both
objectives were only partially addressed. This suggests strongly that the EU regime
was likely compromised by commercial interests of domestic industries.89 In
reality, the discrimination did lead to ‘substitution of imports from Canada and
Norway with imports from Greenland.’90 Thus, the AB was right to rule against
the discrimination so as to defend the function of the WTO in disciplining the use
of protectionist policy instrument. The AB’s rulings have the effect of pushing the
EU to improve the seal regime for the protection of seals as well as to provide
equal access to indigenous hunts from the other parties under the IC exception.91
In the meantime, the AB left the flexibility for the EU to continue to use the seal
regime and the IC exception to pursue the chosen objectives. To the extent that its
decision may adversely affect the subsistence need of Greenlandic Inuit community
to hunt for commercial purpose, the AB left flexibility for the EU to address it
more specifically using other policy instruments. Overall, the AB’s rulings were
reasonably balanced between the regulation of protectionist policies and the pre-
servation of regulatory autonomy.
4 SYSTEMIC SOLUTIONS: POLITICAL OVERSIGHT AND
LEGISLATIVE IMPROVEMENT
The case studies above have shown that US allegation of judicial overreach in major
TBT cases is untenable. Instead, the AB’s approaches and decisions are not only legally
and economically sound but also politically savvy. In line with the fundamental
88 See Panel Report, EC – Seal Products, supra n. 81, paras 7.441–461.
89 Petros C. Mavroidis, Sealed with a Doubt: EU, Seals, and the WTO, 6(3) Eur. J. of Risk Reg. 388, 391–
92 (2015). For an overview of the legislative history of the EU regime, see Katie Sykes, Sealing Animal
Welfare into the GATT Exceptions: The International Dimension of Animal Welfare in WTO Disputes, 13(3)
World Trade Rev. 471, 475–77 (2014).
90 Paola Conconi & Tania Voon, EC – Seal Products: The Tension Between Public Morals and International
Trade Agreements, 15(2) World Trade Rev. 211, 225 (2016).
91 For the EU’s implementation measure, see Regulation (EU) 2015/1775 amending Regulation (EC)
No 1007/2009 on trade in seal products and repealing Commission Regulation (EU) No 737/2010,
OJ L 262/2 (6 Oct. 2015). Also see Donald H Regan, Measures with Multiple Purposes: Puzzles from
EC – Seal Products 108 AJIL Unbound 315, 321 (2015); Howse, Langille & Sykes, supra n. 87.
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function of the WTO, the AB has endeavoured to strike an appropriate balance
between reigning in protectionism and maintaining regulatory autonomy.
However, we believe that the underlying cause of US concerns about the AB – and
the allegation of judicial overreach in particular – goes beyond the AB’s interpretations
and rulings in individual disputes. Rather, it reflects US frustration with the lack of an
effective mechanism that allows a proper political check on the decisions of WTO
tribunals.92 Essentially, this is a result of the operation of the negative consensus rule
whereby AB interpretations and decisions are automatically adopted while positive
consensus or a special majority vote is required for Members to overturn these inter-
pretations and decisions through authoritative interpretation93 or amendments ofWTO
agreements.94 This issue has been increasingly aggravated due to the continued legisla-
tive failure of the WTO in updating its rulebook to address new and challenging issues.
4.1 RECENT PROPOSALS
Most of the recent proposals tabled by WTO Members have fallen short of provid-
ing an adequate and systemic solution to the issue of judicial overreach or US
concerns about the imbalance between political and judicial powers. Indeed, the
proposals devoted to the issue of judicial overreach have suggested that political
scrutiny of judicial decisions could be exercised through either existing WTO
mechanisms (i.e. authoritative interpretation or amendments) or new mechanisms
such as creating an external review body or a regular dialogue channel between the
AB and WTO Members.95 However, the existing mechanisms are unlikely to work
given the tradition of consensus decision-making.96 Moreover, even if voting can be
92 See generally McDougall, supra n. 4.
93 See Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, 15 Apr. 1994, 1867 U.N.T.S.
154, 33 I.L.M. 1144 (1994) [hereinafter WTO Agreement]. Art. IX.2 provides:
The Ministerial Conference and the General Council shall have the exclusive authority to adopt
interpretations of this Agreement and of the Multilateral Trade Agreements. In the case of an
interpretation of a Multilateral Trade Agreement in Annex 1, they shall exercise their authority on
the basis of a recommendation by the Council overseeing the functioning of that Agreement. The
decision to adopt an interpretation shall be taken by a three-fourths majority of the Members. This
paragraph shall not be used in a manner that would undermine the amendment provisions in Art. X.
94 Ibid., Art. X.
95 See e.g. WTO, General Council, Adjudicative Bodies: Adding to or Diminishing Rights or
Obligations under The WTO Agreement – Communication from Australia and Singapore to the
General Council, WT/GC/W/754 (30 Nov. 2018); WTO, General Council, Informal Process on
Matters related to The Functioning of the Appellate Body – Report by the Facilitator, H.E. Dr David
Walker (New Zealand), JOB/GC/215 (1 Mar. 2019); WTO, General Council, Informal Process on
Matters related to The Functioning of the Appellate Body – Communication from Japan and Australia,
WT/GC/W/768 (18 Apr. 2019).
96 For a detailed analysis of the shortcomings of the WTO decision-making process, see Claus-Dieter
Ehlermann & Lothar Ehring, Decision-Making in the World Trade Organization, 8(1) J. of Int’l Econ. L.
51 (2005).
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utilized, the special majority thresholds will also be difficult to meet.97 On the other
hand, further details of the proposed new mechanisms are required to assess whether
they may provide the political oversight needed.
In view of the impending paralysis of the AB by the end of the year, several
temporary solutions have been proposed to maintain a functional DSM. These
included, inter alia, ad hoc agreements between disputing parties to resort to
arbitration pursuant to Article 25 of the DSU,98 a decision by WTO Members to
temporarily waive appellate review pursuant to Article IX.3 of the WTO
Agreement,99 automatic completion of appeals on the day of the lodgement of a
notice of appeal,100 and the creation of an alternate appellate review mechanism by
WTO Members excluding the US.101 In the meantime, some disputing parties have
agreed to not appeal panel decisions on a case-by-case basis.102 Again, the major
problem with these proposals is that they do not address the systemic issue relating to
the lack of political oversight over rulings of WTO tribunals. Here, one must note
that the issue of judicial overreach is not confined to the AB but may arise in any
judicial body that has the power to develop international trade rules and decide the
outcome of trade disputes. Thus, even if the AB were gone, this issue would still
persist with respect to panels or arbitrators. Indeed, with the (anticipated) diminish-
ing role of the AB and the trend of reverting to the one-stage dispute settlement
system, WTO panels may become increasingly ‘intrusive’ in interpreting WTO
rules. The panel’s interpretation of the Security Exceptions clause in the recent
Russia – Traffic in Transit case could be seen, by the US or other Members, as yet
another example of judicial overreach as it rejected the US’s firm position on how
this exception clause should operate.103 In US – Differential Pricing Methodology, the
97 For an analysis of the difficulties in the use of authoritative interpretation under Art. IX.2 of the WTO
Agreement, see Claus-Dieter Ehlermann & Lothar Ehring, The Authoritative Interpretation Under Article
IX:2 of the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization: Current Law, Practice and Possible
Improvements, 8(4) J. of Int’l Econ. L. 803 (2005). For a discussion of how to improve the voting
rules to facilitate decision-making, see Jaime Tijmes, Consensus and Majority Voting in the WTO, 8(3)
World Trade Rev. 417 (2009).
98 See WTO, Interim Appeal Arbitration Pursuant to Article 25 DSU, JOB/DSB/A/Add.11 (16 May 2019).
For discussions of this proposal, see e.g. William Alan Reinsch et al., Article 25: An Effective Way to
Avert the WTO Crisis?, Centre for Strategic & International Studies (CSIS), 24 Jan. 2019, www.csis.
org/analysis/article-25-effective-way-avert-wto-crisis.
99 See Payosova et al., supra n. 4, at 10.
100 See Steve Charnovitz, How to Save WTO Dispute Settlement from the Trump Administration, Int’l Econ. L.
& Pol’y Blog, 3 Nov. 2017, https://worldtradelaw.typepad.com/ielpblog/2017/11/how-to-save-
wto-dispute-settlement-from-the-trump-administration.html.
101 See Pieter Jan Kuijper, What To Do About the US Attack on the Appellate Body?, Int’l Econ. L. & Pol’y
Blog, 15 Nov. 2017, https://worldtradelaw.typepad.com/ielpblog/2017/11/guest-post-from-pieter-
jan-kuiper-professor-of-the-law-of-international-economic-organizations-at-the-faculty-of-law-of-th.
html.
102 See WTO, Indonesia – Safeguard on Certain Iron or Steel Products, Understanding Between Indonesia and
Viet Nam Regarding Procedures Under Arts 21 and 22 of the DSU, WT/DS496/14 (27 Mar. 2019).
103 Panel Report, Russia – Measures Concerning Traffic in Transit, WT/DS512/R, adopted 26 Apr. 2019.
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panel started to offer new interpretations on the issue of zeroing.104 While the
panel’s decision pleased the US,105 it may well be regarded as judicial overreach
by Canada and other WTO Members which oppose the US practice. The panel’s
bold deviation from well-established WTO jurisprudence on the issue of zeroing
also impacts badly on the predictability and security that the DSM is designed to
maintain. Thus, it won’t be too long before the complaints about the AB will also be
made about WTO panels. Therefore, rather than over-criticizing the AB, a systemic
solution to the judicial overreach problem is needed.
4.2 OUR PROPOSALS
To establish a proper balance between the legislative and judicial functions of the
WTO, two elements are essential. First, the legislative function of the WTO must
be re-activated to supply the necessary textual guidance to judicial interpretations.
Second, when such guidance is inadequate and gap-filling or ambiguity clarifica-
tions are needed, a viable and effective mechanism must be put in place to allow
political oversight over judicial decisions. More specifically, we offer the following
suggestions.
First is avoiding ‘constructive ambiguity’. Ultimately, the debate on judicial
overreach arises from disagreements with the AB’s interpretation of certain treaty
text. Thus, the solution has to start with the drafting of the treaty. In the context of
the WTO, there is a long history of resorting to ‘constructive ambiguity’, i.e. using
ambiguous terms to paper over the differences between the parties’ positions.
While such drafting technique could make it easier for the parties to reach
agreements, it does not solve the differences. If anything, it simply kicks the can
down the road, which might snowball into a bigger problem that is difficult for the
AB to handle. Thus, WTO Members should refrain from resorting to ‘constructive
ambiguity’ in their negotiations as much as possible so as to minimize the gaps and
ambiguities in the treaty.
Second is carving out specific issues from dispute settlement. Notwithstanding
our first suggestion, we fully understand that the nature of international negotia-
tions, especially over complicated issues such as trade, is such that it sometimes is
impossible to reach agreement without adopting ambiguous language that can
104 Panel Report, United States – Anti-Dumping Measures Applying Differential Pricing Methodology to Softwood
Lumber from Canada, WT/DS534/R, circulated 9 Apr. 2019. The panel report was appealed by
Canada on 6 June 2019.
105 See Office of the United States Trade Representative, United States Prevails on ‘Zeroing’ Again: WTO
Panel Rejects Flawed Appellate Body Findings, Press Releases (9 Apr. 2019), https://ustr.gov/about-us/
policy-offices/press-office/press-releases/2019/april/united-states-prevails-%E2%80%9Czeroing%
E2%80%9D.
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accommodate different interpretations. The fact that murky wording has been
chosen out of diplomatic expediency, however, does not mean that such inter-
pretative baggage has to be passed on to the panel, AB, or whoever is called upon
to carry out the difficult task of interpreting such badly-worded treaty text. If even
the negotiators themselves, after years of excruciating battle over the choice of
words, could not settle on the meaning of a specific treaty text, or how best to draft
it, how could they expect the judiciary, which has not been privy to the nuanced
discussions in the smoke-filled rooms, to provide the perfect interpretation? Thus,
we’d suggest that whenever the negotiators resort to ‘constructive ambiguity’, they
should include an explicit moratorium on litigation concerning such texts, so as to
avoid the problem of judicial overreach from arising in the first place. This
avoidance technique could have many other variations to achieve the same
purpose. For example, short of a moratorium on dispute settlement, controversial
issues could still be subject to the normal dispute settlement process, with the
proviso that it could only be invoked when there is proof of nullification or
impairment of benefits, and the only remedy available is mutually satisfactory
solutions.
The third solution focuses on giving more autonomy to disputing parties. It is
always difficult to have 164 Members agree on the wording of specific treaty texts,
or even merely the need to keep certain issues out of dispute settlement process.
However, when there are only two Members involved, the chances of reaching
agreement increase significantly. This could happen before, during, and after the
litigation phase. For example, if the disputing parties agree, they could carve out
specific issues from the tribunal’s terms of reference, or at least the interpretation of
these issues from the tribunal’s terms of reference. Even if such issues are included
in the terms of reference, if neither party is really fond of the interpretation
adopted by the panel or the AB, they should be given the right to reach an
agreement to not include the problematic interpretation in the report to be
adopted.
The fourth solution calls for the creation of a mechanism that differs from the
existing WTO mechanisms to make it easier for the political bodies to overrule the
decisions of the judiciary. As mentioned above, the ‘authoritative interpretation’
mechanism, which has been suggested on numerous occasions, imposes a voting
threshold that is too high to meet in practice.106 In our view, the official inter-
pretation mechanism is rather onerous and strange. It is onerous because it requires
three-fourths majority of the Members, which implies that even Members which
106 For suggestions on how to better utilize ‘authoritative interpretations’, see e.g. Ehlermann & Ehring,
supra n. 97; Cosette D. Creamer, Can International Trade Law Recover? From the WTO’s Crown Jewel to
Its Crown of Thorns, 113 AJIL Unbound 51, 54–5 (2019).
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are not present in the meeting where the decision is taken could potentially have
the power to sabotage the adoption of the interpretation by simply being absent. It
is strange because the three-fourth majority requirement for mere interpretation is
higher than both that required for some official amendments which only need
two-thirds majority,107 and that for official decisions of the Ministerial Conference
and the General Council, where only a simple majority is required. It is illogical
that an interpretation, which by definition shall not create substantive rights and
obligations on its own, should be subject to higher voting requirements than
amendments and decisions, which imply the addition of new rights or obligations.
In contrast, our proposed mechanism is to allow the disputing parties, espe-
cially the respondent, to have the option of seeking a declaration from the General
Council that a specific issue in the dispute is politically sensitive and unresolved by
WTO Members, and therefore should not be subject to the interpretation of
WTO tribunals. Such declaration would be different from ‘authoritative interpre-
tations’, as it does not deal with the substantive rights or obligations embedded in
WTO agreements, but only makes certain rules non-justiciable. Thus, the voting
requirement should be substantially lower than that for official interpretations. We
would suggest, if the disputing parties agree, that the declaration should be adopted
as per the negative consensus rule. On the other hand, if only one party requests,
then the declaration shall be adopted by one-third of the votes cast. Given the
difficulties in adopting ‘authoritative interpretations’ or amendments of WTO
rules, our suggestion for an expedited declaration procedure fills the gap by making
it much easier for the political bodies to exercise oversight over the judicial bodies,
and in the meantime avoids the risk of altering the existing rights and obligations of
WTO Members. Along the same lines, we suggest that the declaration procedure
should also be available for the General Council to clarify that any problematic
interpretations in a case only apply to the current dispute and do not bind future
panels and the AB. At the request of the disputing parties, this would also
exonerate the AB from DSU Article 17.12 and allow the AB to decline to address
certain issues, especially if they are not necessary to resolving the dispute at
hand.108
Regardless of the option chosen, we believe that the key is to keep sensitive
political issues out of the dispute settlement chambers, especially those which even
the diplomats and politicians themselves could not have resolved. This is crucial to
maintain the functioning, and to some extent even the survival, of the judicial
107 See WTO Agreement, supra n. 93, Art. X.4.
108 Art. 17.12 of the DSU states that ‘The Appellate Body shall address each of the issues raised in
accordance with paragraph 6 during the appellate proceeding.’ Art. 17.6 relevantly provides that ‘An
appeal shall be limited to issues of law covered in the panel report and legal interpretations developed
by the panel.’
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system. As famously stated by Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr., ‘hard cases make
bad law’.109 A judiciary that finds itself between a rock and a hard place too often
will find it quite a challenge to maintain its existence, or even just its integrity. This
is exactly the fate that has befallen on the AB.
5 CONCLUSION
In his masterpiece ‘Double Star’,110 which won him a Hugo Award, Robert A.
Heinlein told the story of a destitute actor who took on the job as the temporary
double for an unspecified politician, only to find himself having to assume the role
of the most prominent politicians in the Solar System for life when the subject of
his impersonation died from the mistreatment suffered during his kidnapping.
Reflecting on his adventure twenty-five years later, our hero makes the observa-
tion (misattributing the quote to Voltaire) that ‘[i]f Satan should ever replace God
he would find it necessary to assume the attributes of Divinity.’
While such analogy is not entirely appropriate, we believe that it does some-
what reflect the fate of the AB, the panel, or whoever might be called upon to
carry out the important yet thankless task of dispute settlement and treaty inter-
pretation. As we have demonstrated above, to decide complicated international
trade disputes based on highly abstract and sometimes incomplete rules, one
necessarily has to improvise by putting oneself into the shoes of the drafter of
the treaties. The US regards this mainly as a problem with the AB, and it tries to
solve the problem by blocking the appointment process for AB members, probably
in the hope of strangling the AB to death.
To avoid the potential paralysis of the DSM, WTO Members and trade law
professionals have made considerable and dedicated efforts to address US concerns
in the hope that the US will change its mind. To date, these efforts have been
unsuccessful as the US continues to claim that its concerns have not been resolved.
By focusing on the issue of judicial overreach, which is the US’s most
significant concern, this article offers a number of arguments and solutions.
First, it argues that the allegation of judicial overreach is untenable. There are
no established criteria/standards for the determination of judicial overreach.
Rather, the issue of whether the judiciary has overstepped its authority remains
highly controversial not only under the WTO but also in domestic courts and
other international courts. Moreover, judicial overreach does not occur merely
because one disagrees with the interpretations adopted by WTO tribunals or
the (unfavourable) outcome of a dispute. As the application of the general rules
109 Northern Securities Co v. United States, 193 US 197,400 (1904) (Holmes dissenting).
110 Robert A. Heinlein, Double Star (Del Rey Publishing 1986).
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of treaty interpretation often leads to more than one permissible interpretation,
a better way to assess judicial overreach would be to rely on the overarching
function of the WTO in disciplining the use of protectionist measures that are
disguised as non-protectionist regulatory goals. In the major TBT cases, the
AB’s approaches and decisions have served this function and hence should not
be treated as ‘overreaching’.
Second, the allegation of judicial overreach reflects two broader and more
systemic issues – the failure by the WTO legislature to update trade rules and the
failure of the political bodies to exercise meaningful oversight over judicial deci-
sions. Thus, the underlying problem is not with the ‘over-reach’ of the judiciary,
but is more about the ‘under-reach’ of the legislature in either filling gaps or
clarifying ambiguities in WTO rules or finding ways to overturn AB rulings they
regard as problematic. In this article, we have outlined a few proposals which are
not only principled as they address the root of the problem, but also practical
because they are much easier to implement than the existing mechanisms. The
common goal of these proposals is to encourage the legislature to supply the textual
guidance necessary for judicial interpretation and failing that, to create the flex-
ibility for Members to prevent ‘bad laws’ by keeping ‘hard cases’ away from the
dispute settlement system. These proposals, therefore, would help achieve a proper
balance between the legislative and judicial functions of the WTO.
To this end, it is important to reiterate that judicial overreach is not exclu-
sively an AB issue but may arise in any adjudicative body that takes over the role of
the AB. Indeed, this issue has started to emerge with WTO panels in recent cases.
Thus, most temporary solutions are unlikely to work in the long run if the systemic
issues discussed above are not resolved. This is also true regardless of whether the
AB survives this crisis. At the end of the day, the success or failure of the WTO, as
a Member-driven organization, ultimately depends on its Members. As agents
retained to carry out the will of the principal, the adjudicative bodies can only
be as successful as the WTO Members, acting through various political bodies such
as the General Council, allow them to be.
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